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 Why We Fight
 A Study of U.S. Government
 War-Making Propaganda
 Chad w. Seagren and David r. Henderson
 Propaganda in Support of War
 In this paper, we examine the extent to which officials within the U.S. government
 employ propaganda to influence the American public's opinion regarding going to
 war. We begin with a definition of propaganda as "the deliberate attempt to
 persuade people to think and behave in a desired way''' (Taylor 1995, 6, emphasis in
 original), to which we add, "using means that involve either selective information or
 outright deception." We concentrate primarily on the public statements or actions of
 the president, secretary of defense, and high-ranking members of the military, though
 we also allow for the products of various other agencies insofar as they relate to foreign
 policy.
 In wartime, the U.S. government might engage in legitimate propaganda to
 influence the behavior of foreign people and governments. Such propaganda may
 attempt to convince the members of opposing armies to give up or to encourage citizens
 of belligerent governments to press their governments to end the war.1 However, our
 focus in this paper is on propaganda intended to mislead Americans. Our main finding is
 that in the three wars we examine, the U.S. government has systematically misinformed
 Chad W. Seagren is senior lecturer of economics in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the
 Naval Postgraduate School. David R. Henderson is emeritus professor of economics in the Graduate
 School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School and a research fellow with the Hoover
 Institution at Stanford University.
 1. See Paul 2008 for more information on U.S. information-operations doctrine, including propaganda.
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 Americans about various aspects of the war, all with the goal of persuading them to
 support the initiation or conduct of the war or both. A reasonable case can be made that
 in all three instances the misinformation caused Americans to be more supportive of the
 war than they would otherwise have been.
 Politicians leverage an information asymmetry when they engage in propaganda.
 We seek to identify characteristics of scenarios in which such asymmetries are more likely
 to exist and citizens are more susceptible to propaganda.
 Scholars, military science theorists, and career officers who attend the armed
 services' staff colleges routinely cite the "will of the American people" as the strategic
 center of gravity for U.S. conflicts during the period after World War II (Schmader
 1993; Von Wald 1995; Kasupski 2000; Upchurch 2009; Boylan 2015).2 General Peter
 Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2001 to 2004, stated, "The will of the
 American people to carry on the war on terror prevents the enemy from meeting its
 objective; it is the enemy's center of gravity" (quoted in Garamone 2006). According to
 U.S. military doctrine, a belligerent's center of gravity is "the source of power that
 provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act" (U.S. Department
 of Defense 2002, 29; see also Clausewitz 2009, 144). Thus, in those instances when
 the will of the people is one's own center of gravity, for a military intervention to succeed
 the national will must be protected from attack or subversion. For example, because the
 U.S. government enjoyed massive technological superiority against North Vietnam,
 one reason the intervention there ended in strategic failure may have been that the
 American public simply lost its will to support the fight (Gelb 1972; Mandelbaum
 1982; Summers 1995). An important lesson that political leaders and some military
 leaders seem to have drawn from the Vietnam experience is that they need to
 cultivate the public's willingness to fight and then jealously protect that willingness
 from harm.
 For example, General Creighton Abrams was chief of staff of the army im
 mediately following the Vietnam War and oversaw the enormous reorganization of
 the army's active and reserve elements. He purposely placed a large proportion of
 necessary combat power in the reserves in order to ensure that "they're not taking us
 to war again without calling up the reserves" (quoted inSorley 1991,45). A member
 of his staff confirmed that "General Abrams hoped this would correct one of the
 major deficiencies of the American involvement in the Vietnam War—the com
 mitment of the army to sustained combat without explicit support of the American
 people as expressed by their representatives in Congress" (quoted in Sorley
 1991, 46).
 The importance of the "will of the American people" to scholars of military science
 and military history is difficult to overstate. Political scientists routinely acknowledge the
 salience of foreign-policy issues to American voters, especially the decision to use
 2. See Eichenberg 2005 for a political science study that considers factors such as mission success, casualties,
 and objectives as determinants of the popularity of military interventions.
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 military force (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Klarevas 2002). We argue that political
 leaders who believe in this importance will attempt to influence people's opinions
 about the use of military force. It is critical to note that they seek to influence public
 opinion not merely for democratic reasons such as passing legislation that authorizes
 the use of military force in a particular situation but also because positive public
 opinion of a military intervention can, in their view, be a military necessity. Thus,
 anything that undercuts the people's support ultimately places military victory at
 risk.
 Public Choice Provides a Useful Lens
 One of the earliest and most important contributions to public-choice theory is
 Anthony Downs's (1957) paradox of voting. The paradox states that because the
 likelihood is extremely small that any individual's vote will be the one that decides
 the election, the practical benefits to voting are essentially zero. Yet the opportunity
 costs of voting are undeniably positive. The paradox is that people do, in fact, turn
 out to vote even though economic theory suggests that such behavior is irrational.3
 An implication of this paradox germane to the present discussion is that, given the
 seeming futility of voting, individual citizens generally have little or no incentive to
 gather information and educate themselves about political issues. Even if econo
 mists' view of rationality is too narrow, which we believe it is, the incentive for voters
 to gather information and educate themselves on the issues is still low. Those who
 get expressive benefits from voting can still get those benefits without being par
 ticularly informed. This state of ignorance leaves them susceptible to the influence of
 propaganda.
 Several public-choice scholars have considered propaganda and the voting public's
 vulnerability to it. Thomas Dalton (1977) developed a model in which ignorance of
 citizens' preferences results in suboptimal policies and de facto coercion.4 His model
 shows that in certain instances government may employ propaganda in an effort to
 influence citizen preferences and reduce the amount of perceived coercion. In other
 words, when government policy diverges from citizens' true preferences, government
 may propagandize to reduce the perceived divergence.
 Tobias Ursprung presents a model that specifically leverages the paradox of voting
 to suggest that constituents are "happy to receive free information, in order to improve
 the basis for their 'well-founded' decision" (1994,261). Because special interests stand
 to gain financially from a favorable political outcome, they may have an incentive to
 3. We note that economists who conclude that voting is irrational have a narrow view of rationality: they
 typically do not include as a benefit the expressive pleasure people get from voting.
 4. Dalton follows Breton 1974, 56, when he defines the degree of coercion as "the difference (whether
 positive or negative) between the amount desired of public policies (at existing tax-prices and incomes) and
 that provided" (1977, 85).
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 provide selective information to potential voters in an effort to sway voting behavior.
 It is important to note that this information need not always alter voters' preferences;
 it may work to fill in gaps in voter knowledge and change perceptions of the causes
 and effects of various policy proposals. Similarly, Reiner Eichenberger and Angel
 Serna (1996) develop a model in which voters receive information that either
 improves or reduces the accuracy with which they assess policy, and they examine
 how certain actors may engage in political propaganda. Likewise, it is not necessary
 for our analysis that the propaganda affect preferences, merely that it is selec
 tive information that alters perceptions of policy. Voters' general inability or un
 willingness to overcome their informational deficiencies has long provided the
 foundation for democratic institutions' vulnerability to exploitation by special
 interest groups.5
 The sine qua non of public choice is imperfect information on the part of voters
 and citizens generally. This means that they are open to being persuaded by pro
 paganda. Although not using an explicitly public-choice framework, two recent articles
 give strong evidence that government propaganda can powerfully influence behavior.
 David Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) shows that radio broadcasts over station KTLM by
 Hutu government officials inciting violence against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda in
 1994-95 had a powerful effect. Specifically, 10 percent of the overall violence occurred
 as a result of these broadcasts. Maja Adena and her colleagues show that "after the Nazis
 established their rule, radio propaganda incited anti-Semitic acts and denunciations of
 Jews to authorities by ordinary Germans" (2015, 1885).6
 There are a number of reasons to believe that rationally ignorant citizens are more
 susceptible to government propaganda about war making than to government pro
 paganda on domestic-policy areas. First, Americans are generally less familiar with
 matters of foreign policy than they are with domestic issues. The geographic distances
 involved tend to mean that fewer Americans have direct experience with the incident or
 region in question, in contrast to the numbers that have direct experience with a do
 mestic situation—say, the millions of Americans who personally experienced the af
 termath of Hurricane Katrina. The paucity of direct experience with foreign policy
 means that government as a source of information becomes more important relative to
 a situation in which various sources are available. Another related factor is that in many
 international incidents, members of the military may be the only Americans involved,
 and information from the military is easily suppressed or shaded for political purposes.
 5. See Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974 and Welch 1974 for influential articles on special interests and the
 economics of voting as well as Mitchell and Munger 1991 for an early survey of this literature. Kaufmann
 2004 presents a case study of Iraq War failings that relies on the concept of "Arrovian manipulation."
 6. Interestingly, Adena and her colleagues also show that although Nazi radio "was most effective in places
 where anti-Semitism was historically high," it also "had a negative effect in places with historically low anti
 Semitism" (2015, 1885). Note that by "negative," they mean what most of us would think of as positive:
 that is, the anti-Semitic broadcasts created a backlash against the Nazi regime. Similarly, Stefano DellaVigna
 and his colleagues (2011) show that Serbian radio broadcasts to Croatia led to more anti-Serbian graffiti and
 to more votes for "extreme nationalist parties."
 The independent review
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 In addition, the president, in his role as commander in chief of the armed forces
 and head of state, tends to have a privileged role in foreign-policy debates with respect
 to voters and Congress. Since World War II, presidents have assumed the authority to
 commit forces to combat without first obtaining explicit permission from Congress. In
 such cases, the president may seek political approval from voters only after the fact. One
 aspect of the president's privileged position is that he has control over the government
 intelligence apparatus, enabling him to decide which information to publicize and
 which to bury as a classified secret (Kaufmann 2004, 37). Chaim Kaufmann (2004)
 provides a thorough discussion of the president's ability to influence the marketplace of
 ideas with respect to foreign policy. He makes the points that the president typically
 lacks "competition from an authority of similar stature" (41) and that it is often po
 litically unpalatable for politicians and pundits to appear soft on defense, which further
 adds to the president's advantage here (36).
 Criteria for Inclusion
 We catalog instances in which either White House or Department of Defense officials
 selectively provide information with the apparent intent to influence American (i.e.,
 domestic) public opinion. We examine this topic for the following reasons. First, some
 of the earliest attempts by the U.S. government to propagandize to advance policy
 measures were with respect to war—namely, in World War I and World War II. The
 ffamers of the U.S. Constitution empowered Congress to declare war and empowered
 the president, as commander in chief, to carry out that policy. A presidential admin
 istration that employs propaganda misappropriates the war-making approval process for
 its own ends.
 Second, these successful enterprises of influencing public opinion may open the
 door for a wider breadth of topics upon which government officials may decide to
 propagandize. For example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
 found the Department of Education (Kurtz 2005; U.S. GAO 2005), the Department of
 Health and Human Services (U.S. GAO 2004), and the Environmental Protection
 Agency (Schouten 2015; U.S. GAO 2015) all guilty of violating laws against pro
 paganda (Kosar 2005b).
 Third, since the end of World War II, Congress has generally taken a dim view
 of propaganda targeted at the American people. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948
 outlines how the U.S. government is allowed to engage foreign audiences but is
 prohibited from distributing to domestic audiences any material intended for
 foreign ones (Palmer and Carter 2006). The act has been modified several times to
 further ensure that propaganda intended for foreign employment is not released to
 the American people.7 The Department of Defense is not explicitly mentioned in the
 7. For information regarding the most recent changes in the Smith-Mundt Act, made in 2013, see Kelly
 2013.
 Volume 23, number l, summer 2018
This content downloaded from 
            205.155.65.226 on Thu, 03 Sep 2020 16:59:39 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 74 ♦ Chad W. Seagren and David R. Henderson
 act, so the extent to which this law applies to its activities is ambiguous. Inter
 estingly, Article 20 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
 Political Rights (1966) specifically forbids promulgating propaganda for war pur
 poses and requires signatories to enact legislation outlawing this practice.8 The
 United States is a signatory but has specifically refused to agree with this article
 (Collins 2009, 823) 9
 Finally, and perhaps most important, we study past instances of government
 propaganda so that it can be identified in future cases. For example, the term Cold War
 consensus refers to the bipartisan cooperation and support of national security policy that
 most presidential administrations enjoyed throughout the Cold War (Fordham 1998).
 It seems reasonable to stipulate that at various times during the Cold War the Soviet
 Union may have posed a severe or even existential threat to the United States. But the
 evidence also indicates that the U.S. government may have overblown the threat to
 generate support from the American people for certain policies in particular instances.
 "Historians have generally agreed that, from 1947 onward, the president and his
 advisers believed they could best drum up popular support for their Cold War policies by
 'scaring the hell out of America,' by using overheated rhetoric that locked U.S. policy
 into an 'ideological straightjacket,' perhaps even engendering a 'war scare' to 'deceive
 the nation'" (Casey 2008, 4).10
 The United States sent military forces abroad dozens of times in the twentieth
 century (Torreon 2016). These events ranged from brief incursions into countries to
 evacuate American citizens from an embassy to regional wars that lasted for years. We
 limit the scope of our discussion to conflicts that occurred after World War II for
 a variety of reasons, the most important of which is that the president's role in
 committing American forces abroad steadily increased during that time.
 To be included in this study, a conflict
 1. Must be substantial in terms of either intensity of combat, size of the American
 force involved, duration of operation, or some combination of these aspects. The larger
 the conflict, the more important popular support tends to become.
 2. Would have lacked popular support or would have enjoyed much less popular
 support had the administration that initiated it not engaged in propaganda at the
 beginning of or in the lead-up to the conflict.
 Table 1 outlines a list of candidate conflicts. Entries shown in bold satisfy
 both of our criteria and are discussed at length in this paper. Briefly discussing
 conflicts that do not meet our criteria can be helpful. For example, two conflicts of
 relatively high intensity fail our criteria: Korea and Afghanistan. Both were of
 sufficiently high intensity and importance to bear further discussion, but given that
 8. For the text of this covenant, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.
 9. See Kosar 2005a for a summary of the legal issues, especially from the executive branch's perspective.
 10. See Freeland 1972; Gaddis 1972, 351-52; Paterson 1979, 3-4; and Kofsky 1993 for more on the use of
 scare tactics during this period.
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 Table 1
 Candidate Conflicts for Inclusion in This Study
 Conflict  Duration  Hostile U.S. Deaths  Intensity  Propaganda
 Korea  1950-53  36,574  High
 Vietnam  1964-75  58,220  High  Yes
 Dominican Republic  1965-66  27  Yes
 Lebanon  1982-83  256
 Grenada  1983  18
 Panama  1989-90  23
 Gulf War  1991  148  High  Yes
 Somalia  1992-94  29
 Afghanistan  2001-present  1,843  High
 Iraq War  2003-2011  3,481  High  Yes
 Sources: DeBruyne and Leland 2015 for casualty statistics; Torreon 2016 for events and approximate
 dates; and Yates 1988 for information on the Dominican Republic intervention.
 each was initiated as a response to overt aggression, we do not believe that pro
 paganda contributed significantly to the political narrative to justify the initiation of
 hostilities. In other words, these wars would have been relatively popular at their
 starts regardless of the extent to which propaganda was employed. The Johnson
 administration engaged in a public justification for the intervention into the Do
 minican Republic in 1965 that differed from the president's genuine intent (Yates
 1988), but that conflict was simply not large or intense enough to bear further
 consideration at this time.
 History of War Making from World War I to the War
 on Terror
 The World Wars
 A brief discussion of the two world wars gives a sense of how the U.S. government used
 propaganda for war in the past. In both world wars, the United States entered after
 belligerents had been fighting for several years. The presidents had already picked their
 side long before the United States began fighting. Whereas opposing Hitler's program
 of expansion in World War II was more easily justified, the case for backing Britain in
 World War I was much less clear.
 Early in both wars, government organizations responsible for propaganda were
 created. President Woodrow Wilson formed the Committee on Public Information
 (CPI) and named George Creel its chairman. Perhaps the CPI's most memorable effort
 was to recruit 75,000 local pillars of communities as "Four-Minute Men"—that is,
 Volume 23, Number 1, Summer 2018
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 people who would volunteer, after having been vetted by at least "three prominent
 citizens," to generate enthusiasm for the war. According to David Kennedy, the Four
 Minute Men were "encouraged to use atrocity stories" about the Germans ( 1980, 62).
 Again, such stories were propaganda: one can be sure they did not use stories about the
 British trying to starve German civilians, even though that happened. Similarly, early in
 World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up the Office of War Information.
 One of the office's duties was to "[f]ormulate and carry out, through the use of press,
 radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate
 the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad,
 of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of
 the Government."11 The Office of War Information commissioned director Frank
 Capra to make the memorable film series Why We Fight. Near the end of the first movie
 in the series, a graphic is shown in which the whole world, including the United States, is
 covered in German swastikas or Imperial Japanese flags, broadcasting the clear message
 that if we didn't stop them, they would take us over. Of course, Hitler's main interest
 was in taking over land east of Germany, and the Japanese, ruthless as they were, wanted
 land in Asia, not in North America.12
 In the subsequent conflicts in which we deem propaganda to have played an
 important role, officials did not employ it as overtly and unapologetically as they did in the
 world wars. There are a number of political and legal reasons for this change in approach,
 but it means that the propaganda they did employ was more subtle and carefully hidden.
 Vietnam and the Johnson Administration's Credibility Gap
 In addition to being the second-longest-lasting conflict for the United States in the
 post-World War II period, the Vietnam War was also the most costly in terms ofAmerican
 lives lost and Americans wounded (58,000 killed in action and 150,000 wounded in
 action [Debruyne and Leland 2015, 3]). It is also unique in the unprecedented level of
 controversy surrounding American involvement in and conduct of a war. The Johnson
 and Nixon administrations resorted to a remarkable degree of propaganda and deception
 in an attempt to overcome these challenges and maintain sufficient popular and political
 support for the war (Gravel 1972). So great was the Johnson administration's reliance on
 propaganda and dissembling that the term credibilitygap was popularized during this time
 to refer to the distance between the administration's and military officials' statements and
 the truth (Kenworthy 1966; Wicker 1966; Sheehan 1988).13
 11. Executive Order 9182, establishing the Office of War Information, at http://www.presidency.ucsb.
 edu/ws/?pid=16273.
 12. See the film Prelude to War (1942), at minute 50:20 and following, at https://archive.org/details/
 PreludeToWar.
 13. Senator J. William Fulbright is generally credited with popularizing the term credibility gap, especially
 with respect to the Johnson administration and Vietnam in 1966. See "Excerpts from Fulbright's Speech on
 Vietnam War" 1966.
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 In this section, we examine the public justification for American entry into the
 Vietnam War. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. grand Cold War strategy
 continued to be a version of containment strategy. After the French government
 departed Vietnam in the mid-1950s, the U.S. government had steadily intervened there
 in an effort to foil attempts by North Vietnam to unify the region under its Communist
 government. The United States propped up the Diem regime in the 1950s and early
 1960s and provided the South Vietnamese regime with American military advisers to
 train and assist the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam to resist the North-backed Viet
 Cong insurgency. The South Vietnamese government's capacity to govern continued
 to erode, however, and, unbeknownst to the public, the Kennedy administration
 supported a coup that ended the Diem regime in the fall of 1963, but subsequent
 regimes were just as ineffective (Prados 2003). A classified report from Defense Sec
 retary Robert McNamara written in March 1964, several months after Johnson took
 office, makes clear that "[t]he situation [in South Vietnam] has unquestionably been
 growing worse," with the Viet Cong controlling more than 50 percent of the territory
 in twenty-two of the forty-three provinces in the South.14
 On August 5, 1964, President Johnson addressed the nation on prime-time
 television to say he had ordered airstrikes against North Vietnam in retaliation for two
 separate confrontations between U.S. Navy vessels and North Vietnamese patrol boats
 in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin in the previous two days (Hallin 1986). In his
 address, Johnson stated, "Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South
 Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United
 States of America" (quoted in Gravel 1972, 3:718). The first such incident occurred on
 August 2 and involved the U.S.S. Maddox and as many as three North Vietnamese
 torpedo boats, two of which were damaged or sunk. Within hours of the second attack,
 President Johnson ordered the retaliatory strikes.
 Thus, the official public narrative was that American destroyers had suffered
 unprovoked attacks at the hands of North Vietnamese forces on two separate but recent
 occasions and that the United States was entirely justified to retaliate with force against
 targets in North Vietnam. However, the second of the two attacks may never have
 occurred. (See Hanyok 1998 for a declassified detailed discussion of the incidents.)
 On the moonless night of August 4, the U.S.S. Maddox and U.S.S. Turner Joy
 were steaming through the Gulf of Tonkin on a DESOTO patrol. DESOTO was
 a clandestine signals intelligence operation intended to map out North Vietnamese air
 defenses. The ships' personnel believed they detected North Vietnamese boats on their
 radar and in the ensuing chaos and confusion believed that they had been fired upon
 with torpedoes and that in returning fire they had possibly sunk one of the enemy boats.
 However, there was no physical evidence of this exchange, and Captain John J. Herrick,
 commander of the task force, reported to headquarters: "Review of action makes many
 14. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President, March 16, 1964, in U.S. Department of
 State 1992, doc. 84.
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 reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. . . . Freak weather effects and
 overeager sonarman may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by
 Maddux. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action" (quoted in Hallin
 1986, 17).
 A subsequent cable from Herrick, a mere three and a half hours before Johnson's
 address, casts further doubt on whether the "attack" actually occurred. Though navy
 officials were attempting to be forthright about the incident, the accuracy of the re
 ported attack appeared to make little difference to the administration.
 We know from the Pentagon Papers that by the summer of 1964, the Johnson
 administration was looking for ways to bring more pressure to bear against North
 Vietnam (Gravel 1972, 3:510-17). After McNamara's report, military leaders began
 planning for "retaliatory actions" and "graduated overt military pressures."15 It may not
 be accurate to suggest that Johnson deliberately provoked the North Vietnamese to
 attack in the Gulf of Tonkin under the guise of the DESOTO program, but it was
 certainly fortuitous that the U.S. ships happened to be in the area when the North
 Vietnamese decided to respond. The Gulf of Tonkin incident presented the admin
 istration with a golden opportunity it thoroughly exploited.
 On August 7, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only three
 dissenting votes.16 Until the resolution was repealed seven years later, it served as the
 entire legal authorization for the American military action in Vietnam. Some 3 million
 U.S. servicemen and servicewomen were sent to Vietnam during the intervening years
 in a buildup that reached its peak in 1969, when more than 500,000 Americans were in
 the country (Kane 2004).
 Several aspects of the situation with Vietnam in 1965 might help identify future
 situations in which propaganda is likely to be employed. Perhaps most important, the
 government was literally the sole source of information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin
 incident, and the incident was such that it would have been nearly impossible for any
 independent organization to corroborate. Second, American involvement in the civil
 war had been slowly ramping up for several years, and the administration was strongly
 considering increasing that involvement.
 The Gulf War, 1990-1991
 After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President George H. W. Bush moved
 quickly to send troops to Saudi Arabia. In an address to the nation on August 8, Bush
 made three claims:
 15. Mike Gravel's edition of the Pentagon Papers contains six different documents dated after Secretary
 McNamara's report mentioned earlier and before the retaliatory airstrikes that offer proposals for the
 application of military force against North Vietnam.
 16. The number of dissenters is usually reported as two—Democratic senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and
 Ernest Gruening of Alaska. Left out because, due to his absence, his no vote was "paired" was Republican
 House member Eugene Siler of Kentucky. See Beito and Beito 2006.
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 That he had sent the troops after "exhausting every alternative."
 That "[o]ur country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face
 a major threat to its economic independence."
 That "[t]he mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not
 be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves,
 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf. (G. H. W.
 Bush 1990)
 The first of these claims seems implausible, and the other two, aside from the
 factual claim about oil imports, were false or highly likely to be false. Of course, that does
 not mean that Bush engaged in propaganda—especially on the second claim, that the
 United States could be "fac[ing] a major threat to its economic independence," which
 President Bush probably believed.
 Consider the first claim. We do not know everything Bush did behind the scenes.
 It is quite conceivable that he tried many approaches to persuade Saddam Hussein to
 pull his troops out of Kuwait. It does seem implausible, though, that when someone has
 tried various approaches over a period of only five days (August 3 to August 8), he has
 exhausted "every alternative." Diplomacy generally takes time, and even threats take time.
 Bush's statement that the United States imported half of its oil is absolutely
 correct, but his claim that Hussein's actions could cause the United States to "face
 a major threat to its economic independence" is probably exaggerated. It has been
 estimated that even if Saddam Hussein had been able to take over Saudi Arabia and the
 United Arab Emirates, he would have been unlikely to cut oil output in the Persian Gulf
 region by more than one-third and that such a cut, which would have amounted to
 about 6.7 percent of world output, would have caused U.S. gross national product
 (GNP) to fall by less than 0.5 percent (Henderson 1990b). Moreover, the estimate was
 biased upward by the assumption, contrary to fact, that other oil producers would not
 increase their production in response to the higher world oil price. A less than 0.5
 percent loss in U.S. GNP would hardly threaten U.S. economic independence.17 Two
 Nobel Prize winners in economics, Milton Friedman and James Tobin, when asked by
 a reporter if they agreed with this estimate, said they did.18 As Tobin put it, "The
 ultimate loss to a $5,500 billion economy is less than 1 percent" (Marshall 1990). Of
 course, as noted, it is entirely conceivable that President Bush expected a much bigger
 loss in U.S. GNP because one other economist estimated a larger impact,19 and so by
 17. At the time, U.S. economists and the federal government focused on GNP, not gross domestic product
 (GDP). Note that the differences between U.S. GNP and U.S. GDP, then and now, were and are small.
 18. We note that when Friedman and Tobin were asked to evaluate the claim in Henderson 1990b, a later
 article (Henderson 1990a) had raised the estimate of the worst-case price per barrel from $27 to $30. That
 still left the estimated loss in GDP at about 0.5 percent, however.
 19. Helkie 1991 estimates, using a large-scale econometric model, that a 4 million barrel per day cut in
 world output at the time would have reduced real GNP by 1.8 percent.
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 the standard of propaganda—information intended to mislead—he was not engaging in
 propaganda.
 Finally, consider Bush's statement that the mission was wholly defensive and that
 U.S. troops "will not initiate hostilities." If Bush meant that Saddam Hussein was the
 initiator of hostilities, which he clearly was, then of course Bush's statement was true.
 But it was strange that he made it. Everyone understood that Hussein was the initiator,
 so why say it? Bush seemed to be saying that the U.S. troops would wait until they were
 attacked before fighting back. Moreover, in testimony before the U.S. Senate Com
 mittee on Foreign Relations on September 5, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker
 stated: "United States military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and
 to ensure the effective implementation of the United Nations sanctions. Our military
 forces are also there to protect American lives and to provide an effective and decisive
 military response should Iraq escalate its aggression to active combat with the mul
 tinational force" (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1990,9-10).
 So it does appear that the Bush administration misstated its intentions.
 Consider also the importance the president placed on keeping neighbors such as
 Saudi Arabia safe. In September 1990, about six weeks after Hussein had invaded
 Kuwait, the U.S. government claimed that there were 250,000 Iraqi troops stationed in
 Kuwait and that these troops might invade Saudi Arabia. But a reporter from the
 St. Petersburg Times, a Florida newspaper, reported on January 6, 1991, that there was
 "no evidence of a massive Iraqi presence in Kuwait in September" (quoted in MacArthur
 1992, 173). The St. Petersburg Times news story quoted Peter Zimmerman of George
 Washington University, who had examined satellite photos that the Times had obtained.
 Zimmerman concluded, "The Pentagon kept saying that the bad guys were there, but we
 don't see anything to indicate an Iraqi force in Kuwait of even 20 percent the size the
 administration claimed" (quoted in MacArthur 1992,173). By all appearances, the Iraqi
 troops were in Kuwait to hold Kuwait, not to invade Saudi Arabia.
 Another way the Bush administration used propaganda to persuade Americans to
 support the war was in its mischaracterization of the Iraqi invaders' actions. On
 February 15, 1991, in the middle of the war, Vice President Dan Quayle stated in
 a speech at Fort Hood, Texas, "There are pictures Saddam doesn't want us to see.
 Pictures of premature babies in Kuwait that were tossed out of incubators and left to
 die" (quoted in MacArthur 1992,73). After the war ended, John Martin of ABC News
 interviewed Dr. Mohammed Matar and Dr. Fayeza Youssef. Matar was the director of
 Kuwait's primary health-care system. Youssef, his wife, was the chief of obstetrics at
 Kuwait City's maternity hospital. Youssef stated categorically that Iraqis did not take the
 babies from the incubators. The babies had died, though, because many of Kuwait's
 doctors and nurses had stopped working or fled (MacArthur 1992, 73). It is possible,
 though, that Vice President Quayle was simply ignorant of the facts.
 Thus, the Gulf War was a popular undertaking and in many ways is often thought
 of as a model for American military intervention. However, we include it in this paper
 because the administration's case for war was dramatically overstated in terms of the
 The Independent review
This content downloaded from 
            205.155.65.226 on Thu, 03 Sep 2020 16:59:39 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Why We Fight ♦ 81
 threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia and the United States and of the atrocities the Iraqis
 were supposedly committing.
 The Iraq War
 Along with Vietnam, few other armed conflicts in U.S. history have generated such
 acrid controversy as the U.S. government's invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq
 in 2003. The putative objective of the war was to "defend the national security of the
 United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq" and to "enforce all relevant
 United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" (Authorization for Use of
 Military Force against Iraq Resolution 2002). Congress passed the authorization to use
 military force against Iraq thirteen months after the terrorist attacks in New York and
 near Washington, D.C., on September 11,2001 (9/11). The authorization cites a long
 list of grievances, but chief among them were that Saddam Hussein had long been
 suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions and that he had a record of relationships with
 terror groups, the combination of which some feared meant that Iraq posed a serious
 threat to the United States and the rest of the world.
 The American and coalition military forces performed well in the initial invasion
 and subsequent conventional battle. Baghdad fell in the third week of the operation.
 Although it was unclear at the time, we know now that the conflict in Iraq was just
 getting under way instead of being over quickly, as seemed to be the case. The George
 W. Bush administration, in addition to finding itself drawn into a quagmire of nation
 building amid a determined enemy in a counterinsurgency, was unable to uncover
 evidence of the massive weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program that it had
 argued made Hussein's Iraq such a critical threat to world peace. The question then
 shifted to whether the intelligence community had failed to paint an accurate picture of
 Hussein's intent and capabilities and whether policy makers, in selling the war, had
 deceived the American people.
 Many books and news articles discuss the extent to which George W. Bush and
 other administration officials may have lied. Ultimately, the evidence is mixed (see
 Kaufmann 2004; Pfiffher 2004; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee 2004, 2006,
 2008; Altheid and Grimes 2005; Jervis 2006; Kumar 2006; Badie 2010). The Senate
 Select Committee on Intelligence investigated the extent to which the intelligence
 community supported the administration's public statements in its case for war (see
 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee 2004, 2008). The report the committee
 issued in 2008 focuses on the public statements the president, the vice president, the
 secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the national security adviser made in
 various venues from the summer of 2002 until the invasion in March 2003. Other
 authors cited earlier cover much of the same territory.
 In its report (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee 2008), the Senate Select
 Committee considers the following broad categories: nuclear weapons, biological
 weapons, chemical weapons, WMD (generally), methods of delivery, links to terrorism,
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 regime intent, and assessments of the postwar situation in Iraq. For nearly every
 category, the committee concludes that a relatively wide swath of the public statements
 made by the administration officials were substantiated in some degree by intelligence
 findings available at the time. However, in several cases, the committee concludes, the
 policy makers either failed to publicly acknowledge the uncertainty or ambiguity of
 the intelligence assessments or made statements that were contradicted by available
 intelligence.
 Although the Senate Select Committee failed to find outright lying, it did find
 clear evidence that policy makers selectively released information and oversold aspects
 of certain intelligence findings—findings that happened to justify their preferred
 policy position. Policy makers who engage in this behavior engage in propaganda.
 Substantial evidence exists that Bush administration officials purposely sought out
 intelligence that confirmed the administration's preferred hypothesis regarding
 Saddam Hussein's nuclear ambitions and made organizational changes within the
 executive branch to facilitate acquiring this information. For example, in the summer
 of2002 the Office of Special Plans was formed in the Department of Defense to assess
 raw intelligence on Iraq to counter the CIA's more risk-conservative position on Iraq
 (Pfiffner 2004). Robert Jervis, in his excellent insider's summary of the intelligence
 community and subsequent investigations of its failings, notes that the fact the in
 telligence community did not bother to reexamine its assessments of Hussein's
 nuclear program once the United Nations inspectors failed to find WMD is evidence
 of its politicized relationship with the administration (2006, 37). In short, the policy
 makers had what they needed—intelligence that justified their desire to topple
 Hussein—so there was no need to update that intelligence to accommodate the new
 information.
 We now turn to a brief outline of the most glaring instances of propaganda
 employment in the run-up to the invasion. The administration justified entering into
 war with Iraq to the American people and to Congress using the following claims.
 1. Iraq has resumed its nuclear weapons program.
 The administration stated that the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein had
 reconstituted its nuclear program. Evidence for this claim included evidence of new
 activity in and around old sites known to be related to the nuclear program, the
 attempted acquisition of "dual-use" technology such as aluminum tubing, and
 attempted acquisition of actual nuclear material. The administration also stated that
 Iraq, given its active program, was very close to building a bomb. Finally, the ad
 ministration claimed that the United States could not tolerate a nuclear (or other
 WMD) armed Iraq because the regime might give such weapons to terrorist
 organizations.
 In a speech in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, President Bush stated: "The
 evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam
 Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi scientists. . . . Satellite photographs
 reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program
 THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
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 in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other
 equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear
 weapons" (White House 2002a).
 In the same speech, Bush stated, "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or
 steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single Softball, it could
 have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." Finally, he issued the following warning: "We
 could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop
 a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I'm convinced that is a hope against all
 evidence" (White House 2002a, emphasis added).
 A few weeks earlier Vice President Richard Cheney had made similar claims during
 a speech in Casper, Wyoming: "But we now have irrefutable evidence that [Saddam
 Hussein] has once again set up and reconstituted his program, to take uranium, to
 enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will function as the base material as a nuclear
 weapon" (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee 2008, 14, emphasis added).
 In his memorable address to the United Nations on February 5,2003, Secretary of
 State Colin Powell reiterated the same claims: "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his
 hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert
 attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from eleven different countries,
 even after inspections resumed.... We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever
 abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade
 of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons" (Powell 2003).
 The key pieces of corroborating evidence the policy makers presented to clearly
 indicate a resumption of Hussein's nuclear program were the continued attempts to
 purchase production inputs such as uranium and attempts to acquire dual-use items
 such as the now notorious aluminum tubes. President Bush drove these points home in
 his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003. "The British government has
 learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
 Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength
 aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production" (G. W. Bush 2003). As Jervis
 (2006) notes, Bush's unstated implication—that U.S. intelligence agreed with the
 British government's claim about Hussein's seeking uranium from Africa—was untrue.
 U.S. intelligence did not agree (Kaufmann 2004, 26; Pfiffher 2004, 30).
 According to the administration, despite crippling sanctions and intense scrutiny
 by the United Nations weapons inspectors, the recalcitrant Iraqi regime continued to
 make progress in developing a nuclear weapon. Admittedly, the intelligence com
 munity's views at the time were rather mixed. In the National Intelligence Estimate on
 Iraq issued in October 2002, the majority view was that Iraq was reconstituting its
 nuclear weapons program (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2002; U.S. Congress,
 Senate Select Committee 2008). The State Department and scientists at the De
 partment of Energy, though, expressed dissenting views regarding the attempt to
 purchase dual-use technology, arguing that the aluminum tubes were poorly suited for
 development of nuclear weapons. Finally, even the majority view of the National
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 Intelligence Estimate was that Iraq could produce a weapon in five to seven years. Thus,
 the Senate Select Committee concluded, the policy makers' statements were "generally
 substantiated by intelligence community estimates but did not convey the substantial
 disagreements that existed in the community" (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Com
 mittee 2008,15). The policy makers consistendy and substantially overstated the speed
 with which Hussein could develop a nuclear weapon and failed to acknowledge dis
 senting views within the community, specifically the view from nuclear experts in the
 Department of Energy that the aluminum tubes could not be used in a nuclear program
 (Kaufmann 2004, 19-24; Pfiffner 2004, 34-36). After the invasion, the Iraq Survey
 Group found "no evidence" that Iraq had attempted to reconstitute its nuclear weapons
 program since 1991 (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee 2008, 16).
 2. Iraq holds close ties to terrorists and intends to harm the United States.
 Among the most compelling aspects of the administration's case for war was that
 a nuclear Iraq could not be tolerated due to Hussein's close relationships with terrorist
 organizations. In the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, this view was arguably the key for
 a great number of Americans to support the invasion.
 For example, in his speech on October 7, President Bush stated:
 We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back
 a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These
 include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in
 Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical
 and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members
 in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gasses. . . . Saddam Hussein is
 harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass
 death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great
 that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network. (White House
 2002a)
 In his State of the Union Address in 2003, President Bush claimed: "Evidence
 from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in
 custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of
 al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden
 weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own" (G. W. Bush 2003).
 The Senate Select Committee concluded that the public statements the policy
 makers made were "substantiated by intelligence information" (U.S. Congress, Senate
 Select Committee 2008, 71). However, the committee made a point of declaring that
 the president and secretary of state's implications of an alliance or partnership between
 Iraq and al-Qaeda were "not substantiated by the intelligence" (71). The intelligence
 community essentially acknowledged that certain members of al-Qaeda and Iraqi in
 telligence may have met throughout the years under a variety of circumstances but
 asserted that the likelihood that they would ever collaborate, given the widely divergent
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 goals and values of their organizations, was minimal. The administration, in contrast,
 seemed predisposed to see—and publicly claim—any contact as evidence of a dangerous
 partnership (Kaufmann 2004, 16-19; Pfiffher 2004, 26-28).
 In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12,2002,
 President Bush stated: "In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further de
 struction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest
 fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw
 regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one
 place—in one regime—we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive
 forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to con
 front" (White House 2002b).
 Of course, the "one regime" to which Bush referred was Saddam Hussein's in
 Iraq. Vice President Cheney struck a similar chord in a speech in Tennessee on August
 26, 2002. He claimed Hussein was "prepared to share [WMD] with terrorists who
 intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States" (White House 2002c).
 The Senate Select Committee found these and similar statements regarding Iraq's
 intent as "contradicted by available intelligence information" (U.S. Congress 2008,
 82). The intelligence community found it far more likely that Hussein wished to acquire
 WMD for purposes of achieving "regional preeminence." It also noted Hussein's desire
 to gain strength relative to neighbors and, ironically, to "deter hostile foreign powers"
 (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee 2008, 74).
 In summary, the record strongly suggests that certain members of the Bush
 administration held ambitions of regime change as soon as his term began. The 9/11
 attacks seem to have increased the administration's sense of urgency, perhaps for very
 sincere reasons. Although administration officials rarely overtly deceived the public in
 their statements, they, including President Bush, dramatically overstated the certainty
 with which intelligence suggested that Hussein had revived his nuclear program and
 wished to use it to threaten the United States. Much like the buildup to the Vietnam
 War, the buildup to the Iraq War was a continuation of a long history of American
 involvement in Iraq. David Altheide and Jennifer Grimes (2005) make a case that the
 Project for a New American Century, a right-leaning think tank comprising numerous
 key members of the George H. W. Bush administration, had been making the case for
 regime change in Iraq for years and saw their opportunity with 9/11. And as in the
 Vietnam case, the vast majority of the information the administration shared with the
 American people was intelligence information. Americans should be on their guard if
 similar situations arise in the future.
 Discussion
 In this paper, we demonstrate that from a military and political perspective, officials have
 reason to believe that the support of the American people is an important requirement
 to wage a successful war. At the same time, public choice suggests that the American
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 people tend to be more susceptible to propaganda on foreign policy than on domestic
 policy. In the three wars we discuss—the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq
 War—U.S. presidents and members of their administrations frequently offered pro
 paganda to sell war to the American people. We note that in all three cases government
 officials were the sole source of critical information used to justify military action. In two
 of the cases, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, outright combat was initiated after
 a long history of less-intense U.S. military involvement.
 Propaganda is a major problem for the citizenry. Although there are no simple
 solutions to this problem, one solution that every citizen can choose is to be aware that
 in wars as well as in domestic situations government officials often propagandize. We
 noted earlier that most citizens are "rationally ignorant." That is, they do not know
 much about government's actions because it is difficult for them to affect those actions,
 meaning, in turn, that they do not have an incentive to learn about them. Therefore,
 one solution for rationally ignorant citizens, given the recent historical record, is to
 assume that U.S. government justifications for friture wars will also contain substantial
 elements of propaganda. In addition, citizens should be especially critical of information
 for which the U.S. government is the sole source and be wary of attempts to ramp up the
 intensity of conflicts in regions where the American military might already have
 a limited or supporting presence.
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